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Abstract We introduce foreign aid and a rent seeking contest for public funds into
the Barro (JPE 1990) growth model. We find that aid effectiveness depends on fiscal
policies, the level of aid inflows and the quality of institutions that restrict appropriation
of public funds by rent seeking agents. These results can be shown to be consistent
with the best established findings in the empirical literature on aid effectiveness. Rent
seeking may thus indeed be a major determinant of aid effectiveness. We further
discuss how aid effectiveness depends on the way foreign aid is disbursed and on the
determinants of institutional quality.
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1 Introduction
Aid effectiveness, i.e., the effect of foreign aid on economic growth, varies substan-
tially across countries. The quest for the cause of this variation dominates the recent
empirical literature on foreign aid. Arguably, the three best established findings sug-
gest that foreign aid is more effective, (i) the better the policy environment, (ii) the
lower the level of aid inflows, and (iii) outside the tropics than within. A priori, these
findings do not seem closely related to one another. In this paper, we however present
a simple growth model with foreign aid and a rent seeking contest for public funds
that can simultaneously account for these three different findings. This suggests that
rent seeking may be a major determinant of aid effectiveness.
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Our model extends the Barro (1990) growth model with a productive public sector
in two directions: First, public funds are not solely financed by tax revenues, but also
by foreign aid inflows. Second, there is a rent seeking contest for parts of the public
funds, and only the remaining funds are used to provide productive public goods.1 In
this model, foreign aid has a positive effect on growth by increasing the provision of
productive public goods, but a negative effect by causing people to channel resources
away from productive activities to rent seeking. The net effect of foreign aid on
growth depends on fiscal policies, on the level of aid inflows and on the quality of
institutions that restrict appropriation of public funds by rent seekers. We argue that
these results are consistent with the empirical findings mentioned above. We refer to
the recent literature that finds institutional quality to depend on climate- and health-
related circumstances (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001) when arguing that
our model can explain why aid is more effective outside the tropics than within. The
positive effect of foreign aid on rent seeking might thus indeed be a major reason
for low aid effectiveness (i) in bad policy environments, (ii) in countries with large
aid inflows, and (iii) in tropical countries in which institutional quality tends to be
poor.
The idea that foreign aid may lead to rent seeking, and that rent seeking, in turn, may
lower aid effectiveness, goes back at least to Bauer (1981). While there is substantial
support for a negative effect of corruption and rent seeking on economic growth
(see, e.g., Knack and Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1995)), there is also some evidence
that foreign aid causes rent seeking: Svensson (2000) finds that foreign aid tends to
increase corruption in ethnically fractionalized countries, which might be particularly
vulnerable to rent seeking. In addition, Knack (2001) finds that an increase in foreign
aid leads to a drop in the International Country Risk Guide’s quality of governance
index, which includes bureaucratic quality, corruption and the rule of law. We agree
with Knack that rent seeking is a very likely channel through which foreign aid could
lower the quality of governance. We see the consistency between the results from our
model on rent seeking and growth, on the one hand, and the empirical evidence on aid
effectiveness, on the other hand, as further indirect evidence that foreign aid may lead
to rent seeking, which, in turn, affects aid effectiveness.
Our model is most closely related to the theoretical contributions of Svensson
(2000) and Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004). Svensson presents a repeated game
in which the direct positive effect of higher aid payments on the provision of public
goods may be offset by an increase in rent seeking activities. Our model differs mainly
as it is based on a standard growth model, and as it leads to results that can be shown
to be consistent with the empirical evidence on aid effectiveness. Dalgaard, Hansen,
and Tarp (2004) present an overlapping generation model in which the growth effect
of foreign aid depends on how much aid is expropriated, i.e., disappears, and on how
the remaining aid is distributed between the young and the old. Their general model
can certainly be interpreted as a model of rent seeking, foreign aid and growth. The
main difference of our model is that the agents’ resource allocation to rent seeking
and productive activities is endogenous. An increase in aid inflows thus causes more
intensive rent seeking in our model.
1 Mauro (2004) has first introduced a rent seeking contest for public funds into the Barro model.
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Furthermore, Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999) rely on rent
seeking to explain why another type of windfall gains, terms of trade windfalls, often
lead to low growth rates. More generally, our paper relates to the theoretical literature
on the interrelations between rent seeking and corruption, on the one hand, and growth,
on the other. Major contributions include Gelb, Knight, and Sabot (1991), Murphy,
Shleifer, and Vishney (1991), Tornell and Velasco (1992), Sturzenegger and Tommasi
(1994), Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), Ades and di Tella (1997), Bardhan (1997),
Tornell (1997), Ehrlich and Lui (1999), Barreto (2000), Mauro (2004), and Ellis and
Fender (2006).2 These contributions, however, do not assess the effects of foreign aid
or other windfall gains on rent seeking, corruption and growth.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we briefly review
the recent empirical literature on aid effectiveness. In Section 3, we present our baseline
model. We keep it deliberately simple to focus on the main linkages between foreign
aid, rent seeking and economic growth. After presenting our results, we show that
they are consistent with the evidence on aid effectiveness discussed in Section 2.
In Section 4, we then discuss the robustness of our results. In particular, we show
how they depend on the aid pattern, on the determinants of institutional quality, and
on whether foreign aid is provided on a conditional basis. These discussions yield
further interesting insights into the circumstances under which foreign aid may work
particularly well and on those under which foreign aid might be doomed to fail. We
conclude in Section 5.
2 Empirical evidence on aid effectiveness
The recent empirical literature on aid effectiveness offers several explanations why the
effect of foreign aid on economic growth may vary across countries. In this section,
we briefly describe the three arguably best established findings.3
The best known study on aid effectiveness is certainly Burnside and Dollar (2000).
They construct a policy index and add an aid-policy interaction term to the independent
variables. They find that foreign aid has a positive effect on growth, but only in
countries with good policies. While Collier and Dollar (2002) confirm this finding,
its robustness has been questioned by Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Hansen and Tarp
(2001), Lensink and White (2001), Easterly (2003), Easterly, Levine, and Roodman
(2004), Roodman (2004), and others. Nevertheless, the view that aid works only
in good policy environments has strongly influenced policymakers and aid agencies
(Easterly, 2003).
Another well known finding is due to Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Hansen and Tarp
(2001), and Lensink and White (2001): These studies suggest that the growth effect
of foreign aid varies across countries because of decreasing returns to foreign aid. In
particular, they show that a specification with aid squared as independent variable is
statistically superior to a specification with an aid-policy interaction term, and they
find that the marginal growth effect of foreign aid is initially positive, but decreasing
2 See Aidt (2003) for a recent survey of the theoretical literature on corruption.
3 See Roodman (2004) for a more detailed account of these and some further findings on aid effectiveness.
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in the level of aid inflows. Lensink and White (2001), but not the two other studies,
emphasize that the marginal growth effect becomes even negative at high levels of aid
inflows.4
In a recent study, Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004) find that foreign aid is
effective outside the tropics, but not within the tropics. They show that a specifi-
cation with an aid-tropics interaction term is statistically superior to specifications
with either an aid-policy interaction term or aid squared. They provide two possi-
ble explanations for their finding: The first suggests that aid effectiveness may di-
rectly depend on the climate. It has been argued by Sachs and his coauthors (e.g.,
Bloom and Sachs (1998), Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999), and Sachs (2001))
that tropical countries tend to grow slower than countries with a more temperate cli-
mate because of, among other things, lower agricultural productivity and a higher
burden of diseases such as malaria. For the same reasons, foreign aid could have
a stronger effect on growth in countries with a temperate climate than in tropical
countries.
The second explanation of Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004) suggests that aid
effectiveness may depend on institutional quality. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2001) provide evidence that climate and disease burden affect institutions. In par-
ticular, they show that European colonial powers were likely to implement good in-
stitutions in places with a temperate climate and low settler mortality, where many
Europeans wanted to settle, but to implement extractive institutions in places with high
settler mortality, which were usually in the tropics. As institutional quality tends to be
highly persistent, former colonies with a temperate climate have on average still better
institutions than former colonies in the tropics. Foreign aid may therefore be more ef-
fective outside the tropics than within because countries with a temperate climate tend
to have better institutions, and because better institutions may strengthen the positive
effect of foreign aid on growth. Personally, we consider this second explanation to be
more plausible than the first one. This assessment is consistent with recent evidence by
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Easterly and Levine (2003), and Rodrik,
Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) showing that institutional quality—instrumented
by settler mortality—has a much stronger effect on growth than geographical
variables.5
Roodman (2004) thoroughly checks the robustness of the three presented and some
further findings of the recent empirical literature on aid effectiveness. He finds the most
robust finding to be that aid works only outside the tropics and the second most robust
that there are decreasing returns to aid. We later show that our model can account for
both of these findings as well as for the less robust, but very influential Burnside-Dollar
finding.
4 It is almost self-evident that returns to aid are decreasing if aid is used to finance capital or productive public
goods, and if returns to capital and productive public goods are decreasing. However, decreasing returns
to capital and productive public goods cannot explain negative returns to aid. Lensink and White (2001)
argue that negative returns to aid can result from limited absorptive capacity in poor recipient countries.
Moreover, Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) present a model in which consumption of aid can also lead to
decreasing returns to aid.
5 Sachs (2003) doubts the robustness of these findings.
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3 The baseline model
In this section, we present the baseline model, which is based on the Barro (1990)
growth model with a productive public sector. We keep the baseline model deliberately
simple to focus on the main linkages between foreign aid, rent seeking and economic
growth. The roles of some assumptions, which are either crucial for our results or which
might appear at odds with empirical observations, are discussed in Section 4. We start
this section here by presenting the setting of our baseline model. We then derive how
agents optimally allocate their time to rent seeking and productive activities, and we
solve the agents’ intertemporal optimization problem. Afterwards, we analyze the
effects of fiscal policies, foreign aid and institutions that restrict appropriation by rent
seekers on the growth rate and on aid effectiveness, i.e., the growth effect of foreign
aid. We further compare our results to the empirical findings presented in the previous
section.
3.1 Setting
Given is a country populated by a measure-one continuum of agents. This country or
its government, respectively, receives aid payments Ft from foreign donors at each
date t . We assume that these aid payments are proportional to the recipient country’s
aggregate output yt , i.e., Ft = f yt with f ≥ 0, and that they are fungible, which
implies that there are no binding conditions attached to these payments. The former
assumption, which satisfies the more recent claim that donors should reward recipient
countries that promote growth seriously and successfully (see, e.g., Easterly (2001)), is
made for analytical tractability. We discuss in Section 4.1 how our results may change
if Ft/yt were decreasing in yt , as it tends to be the case in reality. The fungibility
assumption is in line with the findings of Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu (1998) and
the World Bank (1998), which concludes that aid appears to be largely fungible.
We nevertheless discuss the potentially very positive effects of conditional aid in
Section 4.4.
Besides foreign aid, the government receives a fixed share τ ∈ [0, 1) of the produc-
tion yit of each agent i at each date t . Even though the share τ is subsequently called
tax rate, it stands more generally for any kind of revenues the government collects
from agents engaging in productive activities.
As in the Barro model, the government’s budget is balanced at all times. Public
funds are thus given by
pt = (τ + f ) yt , (1)
where yt =
∫ 1
0 yit di . But, unlike in the Barro model, the share φ ∈ [0, 1) of these
funds, i.e.,
rt = φpt , (2)
is appropriated by agents engaging in rent seeking activities. Since the share rent
seekers may in reality be able to appropriate from public funds is likely to decrease in
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institutional quality, e.g., in the prevalence of the rule of law or in bureaucratic quality,6
we regard φ as an inverse measure of institutional quality: The higher φ is, the poorer
are the institutions that restrict appropriation of public funds by rent seekers. For the
moment, we assume that institutional quality is independent of aggregate rent seeking
efforts, and that rent seekers can appropriate the same shares of aid and tax revenues.
We discuss in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively, how dropping these assumptions
affects our results.
The public funds that are not appropriated by rent seekers are converted into pro-
ductive public goods gt ,7 i.e.,
gt = (1 − φ)pt . (3)
Each agent i seeks to maximize her utility
Ui =
∫ ∞
0
c1−σit
1 − σ exp (−ρt) dt, (4)
where cit denotes her consumption at date t, ρ > 0 her discount rate and σ > 0 the
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Each agent i can generate income
by producing output yit and by seeking rents rit. She can use her income for current
consumption cit and to accumulate capital kit, which is a broad aggregate including
human as well as physical capital. Each agent i is endowed with one time unit at each
date t and with an initial capital stock ki0 = k0 > 0.
The production technology is given by
yit = Ak1−αit (litgt )α, (5)
where lit denotes the labor input of agent i at date t . We assume α ∈ (0, 1/2) implying
that capital is more important for production than public goods and labor are.8
The rent appropriation technology is such that agent i can appropriate the rent
rit = rt if e jt = 0 for all agents j
(6)= eit
et
rt otherwise,
where eit = 1 − lit denotes the rent seeking effort of agent i and et =
∫ 1
0 e jt d j the
aggregate rent seeking effort.9
6 This is consistent with the observation that corruption tends to be high in places in which bureaucratic
quality is poor and the rule of law weak (see, e.g., Knack and Keefer (1995), or Mauro (1995)).
7 There is no rent seeking for public goods. This assumption is particularly unrestrictive if public goods are
nonrival and nonexcludable.
8 The assumption that the returns to human and physical capital exceed the returns to labor is consistent
with the findings of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).
9 This rent appropriation technology corresponds to Grossman’s (2001) technology for appropriation from
a common pool. It closely resembles a Tullock (1980) rent seeking contest success function.
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It follows that the disposable income of agent i at date t is
mit = (1 − τ )yit + rit = (1 − τ )Ak1−αit (litgt )α +
eit
et
rt . (7)
We next look at the two different decisions each single agent must take at each
date t . First, we analyze how she chooses to allocate her time to rent seeking and
productive activities. Second, we derive her optimal consumption-saving decision.
3.2 Effort choices
In this section, we derive the effort choice that maximizes the disposable income mit
of agent i . Following the literature on rent seeking contests, we thereby assume that
agents cannot cooperate.10
When maximizing her disposable income mit, given by Eq. (7), agent i takes public
goods gt , the aggregate rent seeking effort et , the funds rt that can be appropriated
and her current capital stock kit as given. She chooses the rent seeking effort eit that
satisfies the first-order condition
rt
et
= (1 − τ )αAk
1−α
it gαt
(1 − eit)1−α . (8)
It follows from condition (8) and ki0 = k0 that each agent i chooses the same rent
seeking effort e∗i0 = e∗0 at date 0. Thus, all agents produce the same output yi0 = y0
and seek the same rent ri0 = r0. They also accumulate the same amount of capital.
Hence, they choose again the same rent seeking effort in the subsequent period. This
argument, which could be repeated ad infinitum, implies that e∗it = e∗t , kit = kt and
yit = yt hold for all i and t .
We can thus rewrite first-order condition (8) as
rt
e∗t
= (1 − τ )αyt
1 − e∗t
. (9)
Inserting Eqs. (1) and (2) and then solving for e∗t implies that each agent’s optimal
rent seeking effort is
e∗ = φ(τ + f )(1 − τ )α + φ(τ + f ) (10)
at each date t . It increases in the share φ of public funds pt that rent seekers can
appropriate, in the tax rate τ and in the aid ratio f . Each agent’s optimal labor effort
is l∗ = 1 − e∗.
The rent appropriation technology (6) and e∗it = e∗t imply that each agent i can
extract a rent rit = rt at each date t .
10 Note that it would always be in the agents’ interest to coordinate on zero rent seeking if a commitment
technology were available.
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3.3 Consumption-saving decisions
In this section, we look at the agents’ consumption-saving decisions. We therefore
solve the intertemporal optimization problem of a single representative agent (and
omit agent indices).
This agent maximizes her utility U , given by utility function (4), subject to her
initial capital endowment k0 and the capital accumulation constraint
dkt
dt
= (1 − τ ) Ak1−αt (l∗gt )α + rt − ct − δkt , (11)
where δ denotes the depreciation rate. Thereby, she takes public goods gt and aggregate
rents rt again as given. Maximization yields the consumption growth rate
γt = 1
σ
[
(1 − τ )αA
(
l∗gt
kt
)α
− δ − ρ
]
. (12)
Equations (1), (3) and (5) imply
gt
kt
= [A (1 − φ) (τ + f ) (l∗)α] 1(1−α) . (13)
Hence, the consumption growth rate can be rewritten as
γ = 1
σ
{
(1 − τ )αA α(1−α) [(1 − φ) (τ + f ) l∗] α(1−α) − δ − ρ
}
. (14)
Given the standard assumption that utility is bounded, ρ > (1 − σ )γ , capital kt , output
yt , public funds pt , public goods gt and rents rt grow at the constant rate γ as well.
Equation (14) implies that the growth rate γ increases in the agents’ labor effort l∗.
The agents’ effort choices must therefore be taken into account when discussing how
γ depends on φ, τ and f .
3.4 Determinants of growth and aid effectiveness
In this section, we first analyze how the growth rate γ depends on institutional quality
φ, the tax rate τ and the aid ratio f . We then discuss how these parameters affect aid
effectiveness, i.e., ∂γ /∂ f . We find that our results are consistent with the evidence on
aid effectiveness presented in Section 2.
A decrease in institutional quality, i.e., an increase in the share φ of the public funds
that rent seekers can appropriate, lowers the provision of productive public goods gt
and decreases labor inputs l∗, as rent seeking becomes relatively more attractive. Since
both these changes lower the incentive to accumulate capital, the growth rate γ strictly
decreases in φ.
An increase in the tax rate τ has three different effects on the incentive to accumulate
capital kt and, therefore, on the growth rate γ : First, a positive effect as it increases the
provision of productive public goods gt . Second, a direct negative effect as it lowers
the return on investments. Third, an indirect negative effect as it lowers labor inputs
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l∗ (since a tax increase lowers the return on labor and increases the return on rent
seeking). It follows from Eqs. (10) and (14) that
∂γ
∂τ
= α (γ σ + δ + ρ)(1 − α)σ
[
1
τ + f −
1 − α
(1 − τ )α +

τ
τ
]
(15)
with

τ ≡ ∂l
∗
∂τ
τ
l∗
= −(1 + f )φτ(1 − τ )[(1 − τ )α + φ(τ + f )] < 0. (16)
The three effects mentioned above can be seen in the brackets of Eq. (15).
Let us briefly discuss the growth maximizing tax policy, i.e., τ ∗ = argmaxτ γ . Sub-
sequently, we call τ ∗ the optimal tax rate. Remember that τ ∗ = α in the original
Barro model, where f = 0 and φ = 0. Suppose now that there is foreign aid, but
no appropriation of aid inflows or other public funds by rent seekers. It directly fol-
lows from Eq. (15) and the constraint τ ∗ ∈ [0, 1) that τ ∗ = max{α − (1 − α) f, 0} ≤ α
when φ = 0. Hence, ∂τ ∗/∂ f < 0 if τ ∗ > 0. Foreign aid reduces the optimal tax rate
τ ∗ since aid-financed public goods lower the (marginal) return to tax-financed public
goods and, thus, the positive effect of high tax rates. When φ > 0, τ ∗ can no longer
be derived explicitly; we thus depict τ ∗ as a function of f and φ in Fig. 1. This figure
shows that foreign aid has also a negative effect on the optimal tax rate τ ∗ in presence
of rent seeking, i.e., if φ > 0. Figure 1 further shows that the share φ of public funds
that rent seekers can appropriate has in itself a negative effect on the optimal tax rate
τ ∗. The main reason is that an increase in φ lowers the positive effect of taxation on
the provision of productive public goods gt . Hence, foreign aid and appropriation of
public funds by rent seekers both reduce the optimal tax rate τ ∗, which thus becomes
smaller than α and even non-positive if aid inflows are sufficiently high.11
We now turn to the discussion of aid effectiveness and its determinants. In our
baseline model, an increase in the aid ratio f has two effects on the growth rate γ :12
A positive effect because higher aid payments increase the provision of productive
public goods gt , and a negative effect because higher aid payments increase rent
seeking efforts e∗. It follows from Eqs. (10) and (14) that
∂γ
∂ f =
α (γ σ + δ + ρ)
(1 − α)σ
[
1
τ + f +

 f
f
]
(17)
with

 f ≡ ∂l
∗
∂ f
f
l∗
= −φ f(1 − τ )α + φ (τ + f ) < 0. (18)
11 These results hold for any α.
12 When analyzing the effect of foreign aid on growth, we assume that a change in aid does neither affect
τ , nor φ. The former is consistent with the finding of Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu (1998, p. 27) “that a
dollar given in official development assistance to developing countries does not lead to a tax relief effect.”
Moreover, it seems unlikely that foreign aid has a direct effect on φ; it may however have an indirect effect
through rent seeking. This possibility is discussed in Section 4.2.
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Fig. 1 The optimal tax rate τ ∗ as a function of φ and f (given α = 1/3)
The two effects mentioned above can be seen in the brackets of Eq. (17). It can
easily be shown that the positive effect dominates. Hence, foreign aid raises growth,
i.e., ∂γ /∂ f > 0. This result however could change, as we show in Section 4.2, if an
increase in aid and the associated rise in rent seeking impaired institutional quality.
Even though the growth rate γ always increases in f in this baseline version of
the model, the magnitude of this effect strongly depends on the tax rate τ , the aid
ratio f itself and the institutional quality parameter φ. In particular, it holds (i) that
∂2γ /(∂ f ∂τ ) < 0, (ii) that ∂2γ /(∂ f 2) < 0, and (iii) that ∂2γ /(∂ f ∂φ) < 0.13 In the
remainder of this section, we provide the intuition for these three results, and we show
that they are consistent with the three empirical findings on aid effectiveness discussed
in Section 2.
Our first result on aid effectiveness, ∂2γ /(∂ f ∂τ ) < 0, states that foreign aid is the
less effective, the more the government taxes agents engaging in productive activities.
There are two reasons for this result: First, higher taxation lowers the (marginal)
returns to aid-financed public goods by increasing the provision of tax-financed public
goods. Second, higher taxation lowers the agents’ labor inputs l∗ and, consequently,
the realized returns to all types of public goods gt . While aid effectiveness is always
maximized by τ = 0, the growth maximizing tax rate τ ∗ is equal to zero, as seen before,
if and only if f is sufficiently high. Given sufficiently high aid inflows, growth and aid
effectiveness are thus both maximized by the same tax policy: τ = 0. Given relatively
low aid inflows, the growth maximizing tax rate τ ∗ exceeds the rate that maximizes
13 These results are derived in the appendix.
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aid effectiveness, but high tax rates τ still hurt both, growth and aid effectiveness.
Remember that Burnside and Dollar (1999) find foreign aid to be more effective, the
better policies, including fiscal policies, are. Our results are thus roughly in line with
the influential, but much challenged finding of Burnside and Dollar.14
Our second result on aid effectiveness, ∂2γ /∂ f 2 < 0, states that the growth effect
of foreign aid decreases in the level of aid inflows. In our model, there are two reasons
for this decrease: First, foreign aid is partly used to finance productive public goods gt ,
and the returns to these goods are decreasing. Second, higher aid payments increase
the time agents devote to rent seeking and lower their labor inputs l∗. The result of a
decreasing growth effect of foreign aid is perfectly in line with the empirical findings of
Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Hansen and Tarp (2001), and Lensink and White (2001).
It might thus indeed be rent seeking and decreasing returns to productive public goods
that cause decreasing returns to foreign aid.15
Our third result on aid effectiveness, ∂2γ /(∂ f ∂φ) < 0, states that the growth effect
of foreign aid increases in the quality of the institutions that (should) restrict rent
seeking. The main reason for this result is that the positive effect of foreign aid on
the provision of productive public goods gt increases in institutional quality, i.e., it
decreases in φ. Remember that a plausible, if not the most plausible, interpretation of
the finding of Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004) is that foreign aid is more effective
in countries with good institutions, which tend to be located outside the tropics, than
in countries with poor institutions, which tend to be located within the tropics. Hence,
our result that aid effectiveness depends positively on institutional quality is consistent
with this interpretation of the robust finding of Dalgaard and his coauthors.
4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss how the results from our baseline model depend on some
particular assumptions we made. First, we investigate what results may change if the
aid ratio Ft/yt is no longer constant, but decreasing in the recipient country’s output
yt . Second, we look how our results may change if the share φ of the public funds
that rent seekers can appropriate is no longer exogenous, but increasing in aggregate
rent seeking activities. Third, we discuss how our results change if rent seekers can
appropriate different shares from aid and tax revenues. Fourth, we focus on the potential
effect of foreign aid that is truly conditional rather than fungible.
4.1 Aid pattern
For analytical tractability, the ratio of the aid payments Ft to the recipient country’s
output yt is assumed to be constant in the baseline model. In reality, however, Ft/yt
14 Given institutional quality is seen as a function of current and past policies, as proposed by Rodrik,
Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004), the result that ∂2γ /(∂ f ∂φ) < 0 also suggests that aid effectiveness
depends positively on the policy environment.
15 Remember that Lensink and White (2001) find negative returns to foreign aid at high aid levels. Decreasing
returns to productive public goods cannot explain this finding, while rent seeking can potentially explain it,
at least in the modified version of the model presented in Section 4.2.
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tends to decrease in yt . We therefore assume in this section that Ft/yt = f (yt ) with
∂ f (yt )/∂yt < 0.16
As a direct consequence, the agents’ effort choices and the consumption growth rate
γt depend now on output yt : In analogy to Eq. (10), the agents’ optimal rent seeking
effort is now (implicitly) determined by
e∗t =
φ[τ + f (yt )]
(1 − τ )α + φ[τ + f (yt )] , (19)
and, hence, decreasing in yt . Similarly, the consumption growth rate γt is determined
by Eq. (14) after replacing f by f (yt ). As it still holds that ∂γt/∂ f (yt ) > 0, it follows
that γt is also decreasing in yt .
Whenever the aid ratio Ft/yt and, consequently, the consumption growth rate γt
vary over time, the problem however arises that capital kt and output yt (and, hence,
pt , gt and rt ) do not necessarily grow at the rate γt . Moreover, capital and output
growth rates can in general not be derived analytically.
The effect of foreign aid on the consumption growth rate γt is therefore still positive
and decreasing in the tax rate τ , in the aid ratio Ft/yt and in the institutional quality
parameter φ, but it is uncertain whether the same holds true for the effect of foreign
aid on capital accumulation and output growth as well.
4.2 Endogenous institutional quality
We assume in the baseline model that institutional quality and, hence, the share φ
of public funds that rent seekers can appropriate are independent of aggregate rent
seeking efforts e. We now discuss how our results change if the share φ increases in
e.17
Since the agents’ optimal rent seeking effort e∗ is a function of the share φ (see
Eq. (10)), assuming that φ itself is a function of aggregate rent seeking efforts e creates
the possibility of multiple equilibria (see also Mauro (2004)). To illustrate this, we
assume a simple functional form that allows to solve the model explicitly: φ = qe
with q ∈ [(1 − τ )α/(τ + f ), 1].18
It then follows from Eqs. (10) and φ = qe that there are two possible equilibria: A
first with the agents’ optimal rent seeking effort
e∗1 =
q(τ + f ) − (1 − τ )α
q(τ + f ) (20)
and institutional quality φ∗1 = qe∗1, and a second with e∗2 = 0 and φ∗2 = 0. We look at
the first equilibrium first: Like the optimal rent seeking effort e∗ in the baseline model,
e∗1 also increases in the tax rate τ and the aid ratio f . Moreover, e∗1 increases in q,
16 A simple aid regime satisfying this condition is constant aid payments, i.e., Ft = F for all t and yt .
17 Hodler (2006) also provides a model with a rent seeking contest for windfall gains and endogenous
institutional quality. His model, however, is static and focuses on resource windfalls.
18 The condition q ≥ (1 − τ )α/(τ + f ) guarantees that the first of the subsequently presented equilibria
exists.
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i.e., in the impact of rent seeking on the share φ of public funds that rent seekers can
appropriate. After inserting l∗1 = 1 − e∗1 and φ∗1 in Eq. (14), it can be shown that the
growth rate γ decreases in the aid ratio f . Remember that the positive growth effect
of aid, which is due to a rise in public goods gt , dominates in the baseline model the
negative growth effect of aid, which is due to an increase in rent seeking activities e∗.
Here, however, the aid-induced increase in rent seeking lowers institutional quality,
i.e., it increases φ, which in turn dampens the positive effect and amplifies the negative
effect. As a consequence, the negative effect dominates such that an increase in foreign
aid lowers growth.19 Note that the presence of rent seeking is necessary for such a
negative (net) effect of foreign aid on growth; decreasing returns to productive public
goods gt alone are not sufficient.
In the second equilibrium, no agent engages in rent seeking activities since all
agents (rightly) expect that there is no rent seeking and that institutions are thus of such
high quality that appropriation from public funds is impossible. In this equilibrium,
a marginal increase in foreign aid does not increase rent seeking activities and has
therefore an unambiguously positive effect on growth.20
To summarize, taking the potential negative effect of rent seeking on institu-
tional quality into account helps us to explain why foreign aid can be detrimen-
tal in some countries; but it also shows that rent seeking can be low or even ab-
sent in societies in which people trust that others do not engage in rent seeking
either.
4.3 Aid disbursing and taxation institutions
In the baseline model, rent seekers can appropriate the share φ of the aid payments
Ft = f yt and of the tax revenues τ yt . In reality, the quality of aid disbursing institutions
and taxation institutions may however differ, e.g. because it may be easier for donors
to supervise the former. We therefore assume in this section (i) that agents engaging
in rent seeking activities can appropriate the share φ f of Ft and the share φτ of τ yt ,
and (ii) that agents can allocate their time to rent seeking for aid e f , to rent seeking
for tax revenues eτ , and to productive activities l = 1 − e f − eτ .
Solving the agents’ income maximization problem (as in Section 3.3) leads to the
optimal rent seeking efforts
e∗f =
φ f f
(1 − τ )α + φ f f + φτ τ (21)
and
e∗τ =
φτ τ
(1 − τ )α + φ f f + φτ τ . (22)
19 This result is similar to those of Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999). They show that
terms of trade windfalls can lead to a voracity effect and, consequently, to lower growth rates.
20 For an equilibrium with zero rent seeking to exist for all τ and f (but not for the multiplicity of equilibria
itself), it is necessary that φ = 0 if e = 0.
Springer
538 R. Hodler
An increase in the aid ratio f raises e∗f and reduces e∗τ . However, the rise in e∗f out-
weighs the reduction in e∗τ such that total rent seeking e∗ = e∗f + e∗τ remains increasing
in f .
To compare the predictions of our baseline model and this modified version, note
that rent seekers appropriate the share φ′ ≡ (φτ τ + φ f f )/(τ + f ) of the total public
funds pt = Ft + τ yt in the latter. Given φ = φ′ in the baseline model, it can be shown
that ∂e∗/∂ f is higher in the baseline model than in the modified version if and only
if φ f < φτ . The baseline model thus overestimates the rise in rent seeking that an aid
increase causes if and only if φ f < φτ . It further underestimates the positive effect of
foreign aid on productive public goods gt if and only if φ f < φτ . As a consequence,
the baseline model underestimates the growth effect of foreign aid if aid disbursing
institutions are of higher quality than taxation institutions, i.e., if φ f < φτ ; while it
overestimates aid effectiveness if φ f > φτ .
This result suggests that donors can raise aid effectiveness by disbursing foreign
aid directly through their own aid agencies rather than trough the recipient country’s
treasury or other local institutions, given that their aid agencies are less prone to rent
seeking than the local institutions.
4.4 Aid conditionality
In line with the conclusion of the World Bank (1998), we assume in the baseline model
that foreign aid is fungible. In this section, we discuss how our results may change
if foreign aid is provided on a conditional basis and if the donors can successfully
commit to adhere to the imposed conditions.
Suppose the donors disburse aid if and only if the growth rate exceeds a certain
threshold γ crit, which is higher than the current growth rate γ . Unless agents could—
for some reasons outside the model—successfully coordinate on a reduction of their
rent seeking efforts e∗, such a condition can only be met if the government improves
the institutional quality or its tax policy, which means lowering φ or choosing a tax
rate τ closer to the optimal rate τ ∗. The government may, on the one hand, have an
incentive to improve the institutional quality and its tax policy if it gains sufficiently
from foreign aid and faster growth. On the other hand, it may lack the willingness to
implement such reforms if it benefits from the status quo. Moreover, it may lack the
power to implement reforms. Given the government were able and willing to undertake
the reforms necessary for the growth rate γ to increase to at least γ crit, well-designed
conditional aid could be very effective.
Similarly, foreign aid that is disbursed if and only if aggregate rent seeking
e∗ falls below a certain threshold ecrit could also be very effective if the govern-
ment were willing and able to strengthen institutional quality and/or to lower tax
rates.
Alternatively, donors could target foreign aid at strengthening institutional qual-
ity, i.e., at reducing φ. If this could be done successfully, it might also increase aid
effectiveness.21
21 However, Knack’s (2001) finding that aid tends to worsen bureaucratic quality and the rule of law suggests
that it might be difficult to use foreign aid to strengthen institutional quality.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that enriching a standard growth model with foreign
aid and a rent seeking contest for public funds leads to results that are consistent
with the best known and the most robust empirical findings on aid effectiveness. In
particular, this model suggests (i) that foreign aid works better if taxation is moderate,
(ii) that the returns to aid are decreasing, and (iii) that foreign aid works better if there
are institutions that limit appropriation of public funds by rent seekers—unlike the
institutions in most tropical countries. Rent seeking behavior may therefore indeed be
partly responsible for the poor effectiveness of foreign aid in various countries.
These results suggest some policy implications for aid donors that aim at promoting
growth and development: Such donors should focus on countries with institutions that
restrict excessive rent seeking, i.e., institutions that prevent large flows of aid money
into the hands and onto the bank accounts of rent seekers. When supporting countries
with poor institutions nevertheless, donors may be able to raise aid effectiveness by
taking local authorities out of the loop and disbursing the aid themselves. Further,
donors should not expect foreign aid to be very effective if given in large amounts, or
to countries in which productive activities are heavily taxed.
Appendix
It follows from the Eqs. (10), (14), (17) and (18) that
∂γ
∂ f =
[
α(3−2α) A
]
1
(1−α)
(1 − α)σ (23)
with
 ≡ (1 − τ )
(2−α)(1 − φ)α
(τ + f )(1−2α)[(1 − τ )α + φ(τ + f )] > 0. (24)
It follows from Eq. (24) that
∂
∂τ
= − [(1 − τ )α1 + φ(τ + f )2] (1 − τ )(τ + f )[(1 − τ )α + φ(τ + f )] (25)
with
1 ≡ (1 − 2α)(1 − τ ) + (1 − α)(τ + f ),
2 ≡ 2(1 − α)(1 − τ ) + (2 − α)(τ + f ).
Since 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 (as α < 1/2), it holds that ∂/∂τ < 0. As Eq. (23) indicates,
∂/∂τ < 0 implies ∂2γ /(∂ f ∂τ ) < 0.
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Similarly,
∂
∂ f =
− [(1 − 2α)(1 − τ )α + 2(1 − α)φ(τ + f )] 
(τ + f )[(1 − τ )α + φ(τ + f )] < 0 (26)
and
∂
∂φ
= −{(1 − τ )α
2 + [1 − (1 − α)φ](τ + f )}
(1 − φ)[(1 − τ )α + φ(τ + f )] < 0, (27)
respectively, imply ∂2γ /∂ f 2 < 0 and ∂2γ /(∂ f ∂φ) < 0.
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